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INTRODUCTION 
Appellee/Defendants' Brief raises a series of issues concerning the posture 
of this appeal and why the relief sought is procedurally improper and substantively 
unmeritorious. To keep the arguments and issues in clear perspective, it is important to 
distinguish between the claims plaintiffs asserted when this litigation started and the 
claims asserted on appeal. Initially, plaintiffs brought separate claims against the sellers 
of the property, the Soffes, and the sellers' agents, Goodman and Pentad. Plaintiffs 
sought specific performance of the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") against the 
sellers, but also asserted non-contractual tort claims against Goodman and Pentad. 
On appeal, plaintiffs have chosen not to pursue the contractual claims 
against the selling defendants and seek two specific forms of relief against defendants 
Goodman and Pentad: (1) reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment on 
plaintiffs' non-contractual tort claims; and (2) reversal of the trial court's grant of 
attorney fees to defendants Goodman and Pentad. Accordingly, plaintiffs did not join the 
sellers in this appeal, as no further relief is being sought against them. Plaintiffs alleged 
that defendants Goodman and Pentad engaged in conduct to induce a breach of the REPC 
in order to allow new buyers who offered more money and a quicker closing date to 
purchase the property. The timing of the events clearly supports these claims. 
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On appeal, defendants Goodman and Pentad have asserted a series of 
arguments attempting to protect an improper result in the trial court. Defendants' 
arguments on appeal are that the Statute of Frauds and the provisions of the REPC bar 
any claims relating to their professional conduct. Under defendants' theory, real estate 
brokers and agents can engage in improper behavior and then hide behind the Statute of 
Frauds. Utah law does not support such a premise. 
Plaintiffs request a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
as to the non-contractual tort claims asserted against defendants Goodman and Pentad. 
Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct discovery and prove their claims against 
defendants Goodman and Pentad. In addition, no basis existed for awarding attorney fees 
to defendants Goodman and Pentad, as Utah law clearly provides they are not parties to 
the REPC between sellers and plaintiffs. 
APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In their responsive brief on appeal, defendants have included allegations for 
which plaintiffs have provided conflicting testimony. This is improper. On appeal from 
summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, this court 
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should disregard defendants5 factual allegations that are conflicting with the facts set 
forth in plaintiffs' sworn affidavits and as set forth in their Appellants' Brief. 
On page 5 of their brief, defendants make representations about what 
Goodman said in his conversations with plaintiffs regarding the extension. First, 
defendants state that plaintiffs knew Goodman needed to discuss the extension with the 
sellers. That is not accurate. Goodman represented to the plaintiffs that the extension 
would be no problem and he, Goodman, would take care of getting the extension for 
them. As a corollary, if a problem existed, Goodman said he would call the plaintiffs 
back and let them know that the extension would not be granted. (R. at 195-97) 
Defendants then make the following statement: "Goodman promptly called 
the Sellers to ask whether they would agree to extend the additional earnest money 
deadline. (R. at 256) The Sellers refused to grant the extension. (R. at 256-67)." This 
statement is contradicted by plaintiffs' affidavits. First, one of the sellers, Carlos Soffe, 
told John Fericks that he was not aware that an extension had been requested. (R. at 272) 
More importantly, if this fact was true, this denial of the extension was not communicated 
to plaintiffs by Goodman when they called him back prior to the deadline to make sure 
that no problem existed with the extension. (R. at 196-97). Curiously, defendants make 
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no allegation that the seller's unwillingness to grant the extension was ever conveyed to 
plaintiffs until after the deadline had passed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants' Suggestion of Mootness Should Be Denied. 
In their Brief on appeal, plaintiffs requested the following relief: 
1) Reversal of the Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment as to 
plaintiffs' non-contractual, independent claims against Pentad and 
Goodman; and 
2) Reversal of the Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees to Pentad and 
Goodman. 
None of the appellate relief requires continued jurisdiction over or legal access 
to the property which was the subject of the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC"). Nor 
does the appellate relief require the sellers to be parties to the appeal. Plaintiffs' claims 
against Pentad and Goodman are based on: (1) statutory and common law duties of care 
owed by real estate professionals for the rights of third parties; (2) common law claims for 
intentional interference with contractual and economic interest; and (3) fraud and 
misrepresentation regarding the circumstances of the 30-day extension under the REPC. It 
is because plaintiffs have lost their contractual rights under the REPC, vis a vis the property 
and the sellers, that these claims have substance and merit against Pentad and Goodman. 
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The claims are direct against Pentad and Goodman, not derivative from claims against the 
sellers. 
Pentad and Goodman claim that the case of Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 
(Utah 1996) "is directly on point" and necessitates dismissal of this appeal for mootness. 
Yet, Richards v. Baum is easily distinguishable: it involved only the purchasing and selling 
parties under a contract to buy/sell real property; the claims below were only equitable - i.e., 
for specific performance of the sale, and for a decree quieting title in the plaintiff/buyer; 
unlike here, no other non-contractual claims or parties were involved; and unlike here, no 
claim for monetary damages was made. Richards v. Baum might have aided the sellers in 
this present case, if they were still parties, but it is no protection for Pentad and Goodman. 
Pentad's and Goodman's suggestion of mootness is based on a misstatement 
of the case - i.e., that "Plaintiffs' claims are all based on an alleged oral modification of the 
contract between Plaintiffs and the Sellers of the property." In truth, only the claims against 
the sellers were so based. The claims against Pentad and Goodman are based on facts and 
circumstances surrounding the failure of that oral modification. They are independent of the 
claims against the sellers under the REPC. In fact, the trial court issued a separate order 
disposing of these non-contractual claims. Therefore, only defendants Pentad and Goodman 
need to be parties to this appeal. 
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The trial court abused its discretion by prematurely granting summary 
judgment and not allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to complete discovery pursuant to Rule 
56(f), Utah R. Civ. P. That discovery was served on and directed against Pentad and 
Goodman, not the sellers. That discovery went to the facts underlying the non-contractual 
claims against Pentad and Goodman. Appellate relief on this issue does not require 
jurisdiction over the property or participation of the sellers. 
Even if the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Pentad and 
Goodman, it erred in determining that they were entitled to recover attorney fees. Goodman 
and Pentad were not parties to the REPC, and no other basis exists for an award of attorney 
fees to them. Accordingly, the sellers are not necessary parties to this aspect of the appeal, 
while defendants Pentad and Goodman quite properly are. 
Finally, the trial court erred in the amount of attorney fees it awarded to 
Goodman and Pentad ($27,699.52). In contrast to the fees awarded to the sellers 
($2,343.75), the fees amount awarded was not reasonable or supported by Utah law. 
Accordingly, the sellers are not necessary parties to this aspect of the appeal, while 
defendants Goodman and Pentad certainly are. 
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II. Utah Recognizes Exceptions To the Strict Application of the Statute of 
Frauds in Cases Involving Real Property Transactions. 
The trial court erred by adopting defendants' argument that no exceptions to 
the Statute of Frauds exists and in determining that the Statute of Frauds barred an oral 
modification of the REPC. In support of their position, defendants cite selected cases and 
argue the Statute of Frauds mandates rigid application without consideration of any 
surrounding circumstances, such as an enforceable REPC which fixes all material terms, or 
equitable considerations, such as misrepresentations, reliance, partial performance and 
estoppel. 
However, as the cases cited in plaintiffs' opening brief indicate, the law is not 
as rigid as defendants would have this court believe. Defendants continually ignore the 
recognized statement of the law in Utah: "a recognized and accepted exception to the 
statute of frauds provides, c"[i]f a party has changed his position by performing an oral 
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the party to found a claim upon the 
original agreement^] . . . the modified agreement should be held valid.'"" Fisher v. Fisher, 
907 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Holt v. Katsanevus, 854 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). Defendants, however, citing Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1997) and Mills v. Brodv. 929 P.2d 360 (Utah 1996), would have this court 
believe that the statute of frauds is an absolute bar to any oral modification of a contract 
subject to the statute of frauds. (Appellees' Brief at 14). Defendants do not even 
acknowledge the cases which allow for oral modifications of real estate contracts subject to 
the Statute of Frauds. 
To be sure, in certain circumstances, application of the Statute of Frauds to bar 
oral modification of a written contract is warranted. Utah law, however, does not mandate 
rigid application asserted by defendants. Plaintiffs' opening brief discussed all the relevant 
cases on both sides of the issue and pointed out distinguishing facts warranting application 
of the recognized exceptions to the Statute of Frauds in this case. (Appellants' Brief at 10-
19). 
Taken as a whole the cases cited by both parties stand for the proposition that 
in certain circumstances an oral modification of contract for real property may be allowed 
despite the Statute of Frauds1. These cases unequivocally show two things: (1) Utah 
'Compare: Stangl 948 P.2d at 363-365 (holding that oral promise to enter into 
contract is not enforceable where the parties are only negotiating); Mills, 929 P.2d at 364 
(declining to address estoppel argument where it was not raised at the trial court); 
Wardlev Corp. Better Homes and Gardens v. Burgess. 810 P.2d 476, 477-78 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding oral agreement which modified material term of the contract and 
created a new contract was not enforceable under statute of frauds); Allen v. Kingdon, 
723 P.2d, 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986) (holding that buyers had not raised any equitable 
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recognizes that certain circumstances warrant exceptions to the statute of frauds, and (2) 
whether or not an oral modification is enforceable depends upon the facts of each case 
which in most circumstances precludes summary judgment. 
In this matter, the trial court's rulings deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to 
discover and offer evidence supporting their allegations that: (1) the parties had agreed upon 
an oral extension of the due date for payment of additional earnest money; and (2) plaintiffs 
had continued performing under the REPC in reliance on the extension. Furthermore, the 
key fact that defendants to continue to gloss over and the trial court apparently missed is that 
the parties had an enforceable written contract (the REPC) which satisfied the statute of 
frauds. The oral modification of the REPC did not alter the real property being sold, the 
purchase price, the parties or the closing date. Accordingly, the oral modification did not 
implicate the Statute of Frauds. 
considerations or changed their position in reliance on oral agreement warranting 
application of exception to statute of frauds), with: R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1119 (Utah 2002) at f 13 n.4 (discussing Utah law which allows parties to orally modify a 
contract even where the contract specifically requires all modifications to be in writing); 
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176-77 (allowing oral modification of payment provision of contract 
for the sale of real property based on parties' change in position in reliance on oral 
agreement); Holt, 854 P.2d at 579-80 (reversing grant of summary judgment under statute 
of frauds where party presented sufficient issues of fact to demonstrate partial 
performance in reliance on oral agreement modifying a contract for the sale of real 
property). 
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Pentad and Goodman argue by bald assertion, with no rationale or affidavit 
support, that the deadline for plaintiffs to post additional earnest money was a material term 
of the contract which could not be changed except in writing. Plaintiffs argued below that it 
was not. The trial court took no evidence from the sellers to the contrary. It is difficult to 
imagine a more stark dispute as to a material fact. And for this reason, resolution through 
summary judgment was completely inappropriate. 
III. Plaintiffs Tort Claims Arise Out of Defendants Goodman and Pentad's 
Improper Conduct And Are Independent of the REPC. 
Plaintiffs Claims for breaches of professional duties, intentional interference 
with contract and economic interests, and fraud and misrepresentation are all tort claims 
asserted directly against defendants Goodman and Pentad. None of these tort claims depend 
for their success on contractual obligations from the REPC or the oral modification being 
enforceable. In fact, if the oral agreement had been enforced and the property was sold to 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs would have no damages on any of these claims against Pentad and 
Goodman. The tort claims are based on the separate, non-contractual conduct of defendants 
Goodman and Pentad. Because the tort claims do not require an enforceable oral 
modification and do not arise out of the REPC, the trial court erred in dismissing these 
claims under the Statute of Frauds. 
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In order to get a sense of the nature of the tort claims asserted against 
defendants Goodman and Pentad, a few background facts are helpful. Plaintiffs alleged in 
their pleadings and sworn affidavits the following conduct by defendants Goodman and 
Pentad. On March 26, 2002, plaintiff, C. Kurt Hoffman, had a conversation with Joe 
Goodman regarding obtaining an extension for the second earnest money deposit which was 
due on April 6, 2002. (R. at 56-57; 195-96). On Friday, April 5, 2002, C. Kurt Hoffman 
followed up with Joe Goodman regarding the extension. (R. at 196) During this 
conversation, Goodman again represented that plaintiffs could have an extension and made 
no demands for payment on April 6, 2002. (R. at 196). The next business day, Monday, 
April 8, 2002, Goodman sent a letter informing plaintiffs that the seller intended to void the 
contract based on the failure to tender the second earnest money payment on April 6, 2002. 
(R. at 272, 277) On the same day, plaintiffs learned from Goodman that another offer for 
the property at a higher price with a quicker closing date had been made to Goodman. (R. at 
273) In a subsequent conversation with the seller on April 18, 2002, the seller informed 
plaintiff, John Fericks, that Goodman had not discussed the requested extension with him 
nor was the seller aware of any extension request. (R. at 272) These facts support the 
allegations that Goodman was simultaneously negotiating a new deal with a different buyer 
while representing to plaintiffs that an extension had been granted. 
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Based on these facts, plaintiffs asserted tort claims against defendants 
Goodman and Pentad for their conduct which caused plaintiffs to lose the opportunity to 
complete the real estate transaction under the REPC. These claims do not hinge on whether 
the oral extension is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The tort claims focus on 
Goodman's (and Pentad as Goodman's principal) conduct in making misrepresentations to 
plaintiffs and double-dealing on the property. 
If proven, the facts would constitute a breach of Goodman's and Pentad's duty 
of care as established by this court. "Specific to the duties of a real estate agent to those 
persons to whom the agent owes no fiduciary duty, we stated in Dugan v. Jones that 
4[t]hough not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate 
agent hired by the vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable 
at law for his or her statutory duty to the public.'" Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 22, 
48 P.3d 235 (citation omitted). The duty to "Meal fairly and honestly'" with plaintiffs exists 
'"despite the fact that the broker is acting primarily as the seller's agent.'" Id. at 120 
(quoting Secor v. Knight 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.l (Utah 1986)). 
Defendants argue that Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) provides that the statute of frauds also bars plaintiffs tort claims as well. 
However, nothing in the Stangl opinion stands for this proposition. See Stangl, 948 P.2d at 
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359-60. In Stangl, the plaintiff did not raise any tort claims. See id. The Stangl text relied 
on by defendants is found in the opinion's discussion of whether the defendant in that case 
was estopped from asserting a statute of frauds defense. See id. at 362. The court in Stangl 
went on to hold that where the parties had no written contract, an oral promise to enter into a 
contract was unenforceable. See id. Defendants' reliance on Stangl is simply misplaced, as 
the case involved no non-contractual tort claims. 
Defendants remaining argument is that allowing a party to raise tort claims 
would somehow eviscerate the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds does not govern 
non-contractual based tort claims. The Statute of Frauds requires the material terms of 
certain contracts to be in writing to be enforceable-it does not address anything else. 
Plaintiffs do not seek any contractual remedies in their tort claims. Plaintiffs are seeking 
damages against defendants Goodman and Pentad for the lost benefits and opportunities 
they would have received under the REPC. Again, if plaintiffs had been able to enforce the 
REPC against the Soffe defendants and buy the property, the tort claims against Pentad and 
Goodman would not exist. 
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IV. Defendants Goodman and Pentad Are Not Parties to the REPC 
Which is the Only Authority for Award of Attorney Fees. 
The status of the parties in this action is straightforward: the Soffes as sellers 
(not made parties to the appeal); the buyers (plaintiffs/appellants); and the real estate agent 
and broker (defendants/appellees Goodman and Pentad). Nothing in plaintiffs' complaint 
makes defendants Goodman and Pentad parties to the REPC. Utah has adopted the 
American Rule which does not allow for the recovery of attorney fees except as provided by 
contract or statute. Because only the buyer and seller are parties to the REPC, the trial court 
had no legally supportable basis to award attorney fees to defendants Goodman and Pentad. 
On appeal, defendants do not attempt to argue that any provision of the REPC 
makes them a party to the contract. Instead, defendants sole argument is that plaintiffs' 
pleadings somehow "engrafted Pentad and Goodman onto the principal party status of the 
Sellers in the underlying contract for purposes of a fee award." (Appellees' Brief at 33) It is 
impossible to "engraft" principal party status onto a party by allegations in a pleading. If 
defendants' argument had any merit, plaintiffs would be able to enforce the terms of the 
REPC against defendants Goodman and Pentad-which plaintiffs clearly cannot do. 
Defendants Goodman and Pentad cannot be parties to the contract for selective provisions 
which they find appealing to their situation. The Utah Court of Appeals in Wardley Corp. v. 
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Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 91-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) carefully analyzed a contract almost 
identical to the REPC in this matter and concluded the parties to the contract were the buyer 
and the seller. Defendants Goodman and Pentad have not cited a single authority to support 
their argument. 
Nothing in the pleadings suggests that defendants Goodman and Pentad were 
parties to the REPC or occupied the same position as the sellers. Defendants quote the 
allegations under the three causes of action against defendants Goodman and Pentad as 
support for their argument. The first cause of action quoted is "breach of statutory and 
common law standards of care with regard to the rights and interests of the Plaintiffs as 
third parties to a Real Estate Purchase Contract." (Appellees' Brief at 30 citing the Record 
at 57-58, 413-14) (emphasis added by defendants). Defendants have misquoted the 
allegation in an apparent attempt to bolster their argument. The last part of the allegation in 
the Complaint actually reads: "as third parties to a real estate transaction." (R. at 57) (The 
whole allegation properly reads: "breach of statutory and common law standards of care 
with regard to the rights and interests of the Plaintiffs as third parties to a real estate 
transaction."). In the present case, plaintiffs were third parties to the listing agreement and 
relationship between seller and defendants Goodman and Pentad. The allegation mirrors the 
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duty owed by a seller's agent to a buyer as set forth in Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 
122,48 P.3d 235. 
Furthermore, even if "third party" referred to defendants Goodman and 
Pentad, third party status to a contract or transaction is not a basis to recover or enforce the 
contract-absent an express indication that the party was an intended beneficiary. See 
American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1187-88 
(Utah 1996) (setting forth requirements for a third party beneficiary). Nothing in the REPC 
indicates an intent to confer a benefit on defendants Goodman and Pentad. Unlike 
defendants Goodman and Pentad who had no rights or obligations under the REPC, 
plaintiffs had third party rights to the sellers and defendants Goodman and Pentad. Utah 
common and statutory law provide a real estate agent owes a duty of care to third parties to 
the relationship between the seller and its agent. See Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at f 22. 
Defendants are grasping at straws to read plaintiffs' claim as elevating defendants Goodman 
and Pentad into the status of actual parties to the REPC. 
The remaining responses to the allegations against defendants Goodman and 
Pentad are similarly unavailing. The second allegation specifically alleges interference with 
plaintiffs' contractual interests "with regard to the REPC between Soffe [sellers] and 
Plaintiffs." (R. at 58). This allegation sets forth that a contract existed between the buyer 
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and seller, and that defendants Goodman and Pentad interfered with plaintiffs' contractual 
and economic interests in that contract. It does not allege that defendants Goodman and 
Pentad were a party to or had any interest in the REPC. 
Finally, with regard to the allegation of fraud and/or misrepresentation, as 
agent of the sellers, defendants Goodman and Pentad had authority to grant or secure an 
extension on behalf the sellers. This agency relationship, however, does not make them a 
party to the contract. Defendants Goodman and Pentad have not cited any authority to 
support the proposition that an agent becomes a party to a contract. Other courts have 
uniformly rejected this type of argument. See, e.g.. Welsh, 962 P.2d at 91-92; Harris v. 
Richard N. Groves Realty. Inc.. 315 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1975); Harwig 
v. Downey. 56 P.3d 1220, 1221-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). 
Plaintiffs request this court reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
defendants Goodman and Pentad. Defendants Goodman and Pentad are not parties to the 
REPC, and, accordingly, no basis exists to award them attorney fees. Defendants Goodman 
and Pentad have not argued, nor could they, that any provision of the REPC makes them a 
party to the contract. Defendants have manufactured an argument in the hopes of preserving 
an improper award from the trial court. Under Utah law, the award is not supportable and 
should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request this court reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on the non-contractual tort claims against defendants Goodman and Pentad. The 
Statute of Frauds does not bar non-contractual tort claims. Plaintiffs also seek reversal of 
the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants Goodman and Pentad. First, the trial 
court improperly found the Statute of Frauds barred plaintiffs claims under the REPC. Utah 
recognizes exceptions to the Statute of Frauds which necessarily turn on the facts of each 
case. Summary judgment was improper in this case as a matter of law where disputed issues 
of fact existed. Furthermore, even if the trial court correctly determined the Statute of 
Frauds applied, no basis existed to award defendants Goodman and Pentad attorney fees. 
Defendants Goodman and Pentad are not parties to the REPC. Finally, the amount of the 
award is not reasonable under Utah law. The trial court's grants of summary judgment 
18 
should be reversed, the award of attorney fees to defendants Goodman and Pentad should be 
vacated and the matter should be remanded. 
DATED this J& day of September, 2003. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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